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A MARITIME OR CONTINENTAL ORDER FOR
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA?

Address by Peter Dutton at Chatham House, London, U.K.,
16 February 2016

Since the sixteenth century, Southeast Asia has been open to maritime trade
and political engagement, advanced and supported by naval and other military
power. Although historical evidence demonstrates that international trade occurred prior to that time, often robustly, at various times Chinese imperial
leaders sought to dominate the economic, political, and security elements of the
region. During these periods, Southeast Asia fell under the sway of China’s vast
continental power and whatever naval power-projection capacities emperors
built to augment it. At times, to serve the security and stability requirements of
the dynasty, Chinese emperors sought to control or curtail regional trade. During
these periods, Chinese continental power overwhelmed that of any regional state
or combination of states, and therefore the primary locus of strategic action was
continental. That is, China’s land power and subsidiary naval forces were the primary determiners of the region’s economic, political, and security order. With the
introduction of superior Western naval technologies in the nineteenth century,
however, the locus of strategic power in Southeast Asia shifted to the maritime
domain, where it largely has remained since. This shift enabled seapower—
eventually joined by power-projection capacities of airpower, space power, and
cyber power—to ensure the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia more broadly,
remained an integral component of an open, global, liberal, maritime order.
Today, China’s land power is once again ascendant in the region in the form
of missile, air, space, and cyber forces, augmented by a growing naval capability.
Accordingly, the future locus of strategic power in the South China Sea—maritime or continental—is in play. So too may be the degree to which Southeast
Asia, and especially continental Southeast Asia, will have freedom to choose
trade and engagement policies without Beijing’s imprimatur. My central thesis is
that China’s advances into the South China Sea pose a challenge to the capacity
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of naval and other power-projection forces to ensure an open economic and political regional order. In particular, China’s island building in the Spratly Islands
creates a significant new strategic challenge to the open, global, liberal, maritime
order in Southeast Asia.
Many have asked, what are the strategic implications of China’s island-building
program in the South China Sea, and why has America reinvigorated its freedomof-navigation program to begin to address it?
Much has been made of American freedom-of-navigation operations in the
South China Sea over the past few months. As I see it, the purpose of the U.S.
freedom-of-navigation program is to support the maintenance of a rules-based
international order at sea. Some Americans assume that this maritime order exists on its own, that the security, economic benefits, and political stability that
flow from this order exist without any effort from us, like the oxygen we breathe.
This is simply not the case. The maritime order that has promoted global economic growth since 1945 and the peaceful expansion of state interests into the
oceans of the world since 1982 is an order that was created and must be tended.
This order is expressed through a structure of international law and institutions,
such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the customary law the
convention reflects. But law never exists in a vacuum. Law exists because the
sovereign authority of states establishes it, and it persists primarily because the
power of states reinforces and sustains it. Thus, there is a fundamentally important correlation between law and power. Law cannot exist without power to
reinforce it. And power without the limits of law is mere tyranny. This is as true
at sea as it is on land. So the purpose of the freedom-of-navigation program, as I
see it, is to marry American power with international law in order to reinforce the
rights and obligations and the freedoms and duties that comprise international
law of the sea.
Do these purposes serve only America’s narrow interests? Certainly not. The
global maritime system that was created in part through American leadership
has produced secure oceans and tremendous growth in trade and national wealth
around the world. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, where several of the world’s
largest economies reside. True, the rules that govern international behavior in
the maritime domain provide great security, stability, and wealth for the United
States. But they have served the countries of Asia equally well. The objectives
that freedom-of-navigation operations seek to achieve can be summed up in one
simple word: access. Free access—that is, free use of the maritime domain, for
all countries, to the fullest extent allowed under international law of the sea—is
the essential component of an open regional order in every quarter of the globe.
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What is the essence of an open regional order? An open regional order is one
that is freely accessible to all countries—according to their interests and their
capacities—for the purposes of economic and political engagement. An open
region is one that is free of the irresistible gravitational pull of any one power. An
open region is one in which regional states are free to pursue their economic and
political interests and are not bound to accede to the demands of their strongest
neighbor. Such freedom from undue political and economic influence is what
makes a state truly free.
Since the very earliest days of the American republic, the nation’s leaders
certainly have seen free economic access to other regions of the world as a vital
interest worth defending, with force if necessary. Economic access includes the
right to undertake free commercial trade, finance, banking, direct investment,
and government-to-government support; in short, free economic access involves
the full range of economic activities available to all countries. One objective of
the freedom-of-navigation program, therefore, is to ensure the oceans remain
open to support the full range of economic activities in which countries and their
citizens engage.
Imagine the damage that could be done to the economies of smaller states
if they were forced to limit their economic policies to the preferences of the
region’s strongest state. History demonstrates that when one power dominates a
region, other states have fewer and fewer political and economic choices. This is
especially true when political issues become sharp. Disputes over territory and
resources are certainly among those that tend to become sharp. The dominant
state will use its economic monopoly to force other states to accept the political
outcome it prefers. Thus, a state’s freedom to pursue its own economic choices
is a component of political independence. Accordingly, as I see it, ensuring free
political access is a second American vital interest that is also an objective of the
freedom-of-navigation program.
Third, ensuring American security and regional maritime stability is also an
objective of the freedom-of-navigation program. History has shown that the
world never has been stable politically for long, and supporting national security
and international stability still requires the influence of naval power, which can
only be wielded through access to the oceans. About naval power’s ability to address inter-state instability, more than three decades ago the American statesman
and ambassador Elliot Richardson stated, “[T]he classical uses of sea power have
assumed fresh importance. . . . To back up friends, to warn potential enemies,
to neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, to exert influence in
ambiguous situations, to demonstrate resolve through deployment of palpable
force—all these are tasks that naval power is uniquely able to perform.” Although
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that statement was written during the Cold War, it is as relevant to the world we
live in today as it was then, and as it was in the generations that preceded it.
Today, there are many ways in which the maritime rights and interests of
smaller states in East Asia are threatened. In light of these concerns, Ambassador Richardson’s words continue to have meaning as the United States seeks to
guarantee free political and economic access in East Asia. To ensure the region’s
freedom and full American access to the region, the U.S. Navy’s freedom-ofnavigation program still helps to ensure that the United States can back up
friends, warn potential enemies, neutralize military deployments by other powers, exert influence in ambiguous situations, and above all demonstrate resolve.
These are especially important attributes of naval power in the highly charged
atmosphere of the South China Sea today.
Given the context of military developments in the South China Sea, it should
be increasingly clear that free economic access and free political access are underwritten by free security access—in this case, free naval access. In East Asia, where
one regional state dominates land power, the presence of naval power ensures the
existence of an overall military balance that guarantees an open regional order
based on existing international laws, rules, principles, and norms. In short, naval
power provides the foundation on which the region’s economic and political
freedoms rest.
What in East Asia threatens these three freedoms—political, economic, and
security—making renewed commitment to the American freedom-of-navigation
program all the more important? First, in the South China Sea, China’s projection of its national power deeper into the maritime domain challenges the stable
balance between land power and sea power that has up until now guaranteed
a free, open, stable regional order in East Asia. All countries have a right to
enhance national defense, and no one would deny that right to China. But creation of thousands of acres of new islands in the South China Sea—in a region
that at least one state other than China claims as its continental shelf—followed
by building on those islands the facilities necessary to project military power
sufficient to dominate the other five regional claimants is, in my view, a major
strategic event that heightens regional instability, threatens to increase the risk
of military clashes, and, if not countered, has the tendency to remove the South
China Sea from its place as a part of the global maritime commons by turning it
into a strategic strait.
China’s island-building campaign has heightened regional instability because,
by projecting its power farther into the South China Sea and closer to its neighbors, it has weakened the ability of other states to support their territorial and
resource zone claims and caused those states to shift their security postures. It
is plain that other states in the region are beginning to work together to balance
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China’s forward military presence in ways that were not occurring before this
development. Some may think this balancing is being coordinated or directed
by the United States. But balancing behavior against China’s power projection
would be occurring with or without an American security presence in the region,
since smaller states have an interest in maintaining their political and economic
independence.
Indeed, during the years between about 1996 and 2009, as China’s economy
was growing at annual rates often in the double digits, China’s relationship with
its Southeast Asian neighbors was quite strong. China actively engaged its neighbors economically and politically, but did not make any moves that challenged
their security or their ability to maintain their island and resource claims. By 2009
that began to change, and from 2012 to the present Chinese advances steadily undermined both regional stability and the capacity of smaller states to maintain
their claims to islands and resources in the South China Sea. Although all parties
to the South China Sea disputes have built up existing islands to some degree,
China’s island building is orders of magnitude greater than other states’ similar
activities. Additionally, no other state has built large islands where no island previously existed at all. A final distinction is also very important. Coming from the
largest power in the neighborhood by far, China’s actions have disproportionate
effects. For these reasons, I reject the apologists who say China’s island building
is no different from the activities of its neighbors. On the contrary, China’s island
building in the Spratly Islands is the prime action that fundamentally changed
regional political and security dynamics.
Some commentators focus on the statement by President Xi Jinping during
his 2015 visit to Washington that China has no plan to militarize its newly built
islands and their purpose is primarily to support civilian uses of the regional seas.
We should all be looking forward to Chinese-provided public goods, but in the
meantime remain clear-eyed about the military implications of the newly built
islands. As a Financial Times article recently pointed out, “China has stepped up
its construction of runways in the South China Sea since President Xi Jinping visited Washington in September, underscoring how U.S. efforts to counter China’s
assertive stance there appear to be having little effect. Satellite images of Subi Reef
and Mischief Reef . . . suggest that Beijing will soon complete two runways that
will join a newly operational landing strip on a third reef called Fiery Cross in
the contested waters.”
There are reports that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains artillery vehicles on the newly constructed islands. However, whether or not China
further militarizes those islands, the construction on them of facilities capable of
supporting military operations—which in some cases has already been completed and in others remains under way—gives China the capacity to militarize the
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NWC_Summer2016Review.indb 9

5

6/8/16 3:57 PM

10

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 3, Art. 2

southern portion of the South China Sea rapidly. As the recent commercial test
flights demonstrated, the islands can have fighter aircraft on them within about
two hours. Thus, promises not to militarize the islands further are insufficient to
undo the existing damage to regional stability.
In addition to causing regional instability, China’s island building weakens
tactical stability during times of crisis and creates a critical new strategic dynamic
in the South China Sea. Concerning the tactical situation, consider the EP-3 crisis
in 2001 or the USNS Impeccable crisis in 2009. During each of these crises there
was a reasonable buffer between the crisis itself and the possibility that one side
or the other would use military force to resolve the issue. That buffer existed in
part because in East Asia Chinese national defense capabilities were largely continental and American defense capabilities remained largely at sea. That calculus
already has shifted somewhat as China deploys its naval forces more consistently
farther from its shores. That calculus will change appreciably if China further
militarizes the islands with missiles and airpower designed to deny access to the
waters of the southern half of the South China Sea, as it is apparent the PLA can
do within a short time.
How would crisis-management calculations about escalation and the use of
force change if Chinese sea-denial assets were placed on the newly built islands?
Military forces on small islands are similar to naval forces on platforms at sea, in
that they are vulnerable to first use of force by other military forces in the region.
Accordingly, in any crisis in the South China Sea between China and another
country’s naval forces, each side would receive a benefit from the first use of
force, since such preemption reduces tactical vulnerability. This dynamic was set
in motion by China’s decision to build islands with military facilities on them.
The effect of that decision—even if unintended—is to narrow the margin for
tactical de-escalation in some future crisis. Thus, the political and military buffer
between crisis and clash, or even conflict, is, in my view, narrowed dangerously.
Concerning the new strategic dynamic, China’s island building has the tendency to turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait. In essence, it presents a
situation for naval power much like a long Strait of Hormuz. How does the South
China Sea, a body of water at least six hundred nautical miles wide, become a
strait? If the Chinese place sea-denial military capabilities on the reclaimed islands, the South China Sea becomes a body of water that can be controlled from
the land territory of a single country. When Chinese bases remained in the northern part of the South China Sea, it was clear they were defensive in nature and
posed less of a threat to free movement of seapower in the South China Sea. But
the new bases China has built on islands in the southern part of the South China
Sea have military-sized runways, substantial port facilities, radar platforms, and
space to accommodate military forces. The logical conclusion to draw from the
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addition of these facilities to China’s preexisting mainland bases is that the country seeks the capability to dominate the waters of the South China Sea at will.
Building the islands is therefore, in my view, a significant strategic event. These
actions leave the potential for the South China Sea to become a Chinese strait
rather than an open component of the global maritime commons.
Why do I say the South China Sea is in danger of becoming a strategic strait?
The South China Sea has global strategic importance as part of the maritime
commons because fully 50 percent of global maritime commerce passes through
it, as do 90 percent of East Asian energy imports. The South China Sea is therefore a key artery sustaining the global economy. Additionally, it is a major eastwest pipeline for the flow of forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean
and vice versa. If, during a time of political disagreement between China and
other countries, the waterways of the South China Sea were threatened with closure, this would dampen seriously the ability of naval forces to—as Ambassador
Richardson put it—back up friends, warn potential enemies, and exert influence.
This new reality in the South China Sea creates a new zone of competition
between China and the United States, and requires the United States to behave
differently. That is, the United States must demonstrate more openly and actively
its resolve to use naval power to keep the region’s waters open and thereby to
continue to underwrite the region’s economic and political freedoms.
What can be done to address the changes in the South China Sea? And will any
American action be effective in changing the tide of growing Chinese power in
the South China Sea?
There are at least four broad policy responses the United States can lead to
improve the regional strategic trends in our favor. We can strengthen our own
regional force posture; we can build the capacity of other regional states to support their own interests; we can reenergize like-minded states to reinforce the
political, legal, and institutional power of the global maritime system; and we
can undertake operational activities in the South China Sea to signal American
determination to remain a meaningful part of an open regional order.
Will these policies be effective? If success depends on preventing Chinese advancement into the South China Sea, then our efforts probably will not be effective. The Chinese have demonstrated willingness to gain strategic space through
nonmilitarized coercion, backed up by significant military and naval power,
taking advantage of the fact that no party wants open conflict and leveraging the
power of the great economic benefits China can bestow. These are hard forces to
counter.
However, preventing Chinese advancement should not be the measure of
success. The United States need not and should not undertake a containment
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strategy. Therefore the United States does not need to dominate Southeast Asia
or the South China Sea. It needs only to prevent China from doing so. Such a
strategy might be termed an access strategy—one that seeks to preserve economic and political access underwritten by access for security purposes. Thus, if
the objective is defined as maintaining access to—in Ambassador Richardson’s
words—ensure seapower’s ability to back up friends, warn potential enemies,
neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, exert influence in ambiguous situations, and demonstrate resolve through deployment of palpable force,
then it is my view that the United States can develop affordable, effective policies.
Nonetheless, this is not a light undertaking. The United States already has
policies that support some activities in each of the four categories mentioned
above. Whether the nation chooses to do more is a matter that must be addressed
systematically through the political process, because it will involve serious tradeoffs among domestic priorities and security concerns. The kind of strategic
competition needed to maintain the maritime character of a major region of the
globe is costly. Therefore we should engage in it only after a systematic review of
our national interests, our specific objectives, the risks involved in various policy
choices, and our policy trade-offs. The United States faces a strategic choice. We
can compete to retain the maritime character of the region, or we can adapt to the
reality of a region dominated by continental power. In my view, the open, global,
liberal, maritime order that the United States helps lead is worth defending, since
it has brought unprecedented wealth, political freedom, and security.
The American freedom-of-navigation program is a nonthreatening and neutral demonstration that our country will not shirk this duty. But it is just a very
small start of what must be an overarching strategy with clear goals and objectives centered on maintaining political, economic, and security access. The most
important objective will be to demonstrate that the United States will not retreat
from the South China Sea, even as China advances. We must accept that a new
zone of friction exists—and perhaps even create friction there when necessary to
advance our own interests. Such friction will be necessary at times to reinforce
the critical link that exists between power and law—a link that gives life and
meaning to the law.
In closing, global maritime access and the security it provides, unlike the air
we breathe, do not just exist as a state of nature. They must be established and
then regularized through laws and institutions that support them. And then . . .
they must be defended through political, economic, and military means when
challenged.
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